io.github.Z333Q/p402

The evidence

Every deduction below names the artefact that produced it. Nothing on this page was executed: the source was read, never run, and no running server was contacted.

Code Safety

• packages/mcp-server/src/index.ts:208mcp-js-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)

  An outbound request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any part is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at internal hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.

          ? `${ROUTER_URL}/api/v2/providers/compare?task_type=${encodeURIComponent(task_type)}`
          : `${ROUTER_URL}/api/v2/providers`;
        const res = await fetch(url, {
          headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${API_KEY}` },
        });

• packages/sdk/src/index.ts:536mcp-js-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)

  An outbound request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any part is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at internal hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.

              : `${this.routerUrl}/api/v2/governance/mandates`;
  
          const res = await fetch(url, { headers: this.headers() });
  
          if (!res.ok) {

• packages/sdk/src/meter.ts:66mcp-js-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)

  An outbound request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any part is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at internal hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.

          this.headers   = deps.headers;
          this.log       = deps.log;
          this.fetcher   = deps.fetcher ?? ((url, init) => fetch(url, init));
      }
  

• packages/sdk/src/outcomes.ts:35mcp-js-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)

  An outbound request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any part is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at internal hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.

          this.headers   = deps.headers;
          this.log       = deps.log;
          this.fetcher   = deps.fetcher ?? ((url, init) => fetch(url, init));
      }
  

Auth Posture

• authentication_model

  stdio transport: the client launches the server as a subprocess, so the OS process boundary is the auth boundary — `03` §4 does not penalise absent auth here

• transport_security

  declared transport: stdio — launched as a subprocess by the client, so the security boundary is the client process, not a network port (`03` §4)

• secret_handling

  detect-secrets matched 1 credential-shaped string(s), every one from a keyword or entropy heuristic (Secret Keyword). Those flag placeholders, variable names and content hashes as readily as credentials, so they do not establish the committed credential `03` §4's 0 asserts, and this sub-check is not scored; Secret Keyword at README.md:22

• authorization_granularity

  no tool registration was recognised anywhere in the source. An MCP server registers tools by definition, so this is a gap in our detection rather than a server with none, and `03` §4's threshold cannot be applied to it.

Maintenance

• recency

  last commit 134 day(s) before 2026-10-16

• issue_responsiveness

  lifetime median (2 issue(s) in the last 6 months, under `03` §5's floor of 3): 81.5 day(s) to first maintainer comment

• release_cadence

  median release gap 9 days (by tags), last release 165 day(s) ago

• bus_factor

  sole maintainer, and no commit in over 90 days

• repository_signals

  `03` §5 scores this by quartile WITHIN the server's category, which needs a distribution across every scanned server and so cannot be computed while scanning one. It is a post-pass over the crawl and that pass does not exist yet.

Transparency

• license

  package.json declares 'MIT' but no LICENSE file ships with the source

• readme_quality

  README.md: installation instructions (+25), configuration documented (+25), exposed tools or resources enumerated (+30), states what the server does in the first 200 words (+20)

• declared_scopes

  neither the README nor the MCP manifest documents what the server accesses or what side effects it has

• changelog

  no CHANGELOG in the fetched source. `03` §7's partial credit for tagged releases carrying release notes is not applied here — that needs the forge API, which this check does not call

• security_contact

  no SECURITY.md and no disclosure contact in the README, so a finder has no route to report a vulnerability privately