io.github.skyhook-io/radar

version 1.17.0

scanned 2026-10-16
source github.com/skyhook-io/radar
commit 7505b3f51f31
transport streamable-http
files read 2423
methodology 0.2.0
ruleset 0.1.1

Code Safetyweight 30

0measured on 99% of this axis

6 findings in test code are listed but not deducted; 2 vendored or minified paths were excluded before scanning; machine-generated bundles are not the server's own code; 5 files could not be parsed and were not scanned

Auth Postureweight 20

67measured on 60% of this axis

Dependency Healthweight 20

97measured on 50% of this axis

1 vulnerability could not be placed in `03` §6's table and is listed but not scored

Maintenanceweight 15

81measured on 90% of this axis

Transparencyweight 15

66measured on 80% of this axis

The evidence

Every deduction below names the artefact that produced it. Nothing on this page was executed: the source was read, never run, and no running server was contacted.

Code Safety

Showing the 50 most severe of 106 findings on this axis. The score was computed over all of them — findings beyond the fourth of a severity still deduct at a tenth of their weight — so the remainder is omitted from this page, not from the arithmetic.

internal/helm/oci_sources.go:64mcp-go-ssrf-metadata-endpoint (critical/medium)

The cloud instance-metadata endpoint is contacted directly.


// rejectLinkLocalHost blocks the highest-value SSRF target — the cloud metadata
// endpoint (169.254.169.254) and link-local range — when the host is a literal
// IP. Loopback / private ranges are deliberately allowed so local dev registries
// (localhost:5000) still work; broader private-range/DNS-resolution blocking is

internal/trace/probes.go:569mcp-go-ssrf-metadata-endpoint (critical/medium)

The cloud instance-metadata endpoint is contacted directly.

	r.Port = p.Port
	// The dial-time SSRF guard refused an internal/metadata target (an ExternalName
	// can alias 169.254.169.254 or a loopback address). Its raw "(SSRF guard)"
	// string must never surface as a red "unreachable" verdict at ANY vantage -
	// demote to an honest skip naming the blocked target (mirrors probeGateway).

internal/trace/probes.go:1372mcp-go-ssrf-metadata-endpoint (critical/medium)

The cloud instance-metadata endpoint is contacted directly.

			}
			// The dial-time SSRF guard refused an internal/metadata target (a host
			// resolving to 169.254.169.254, loopback, or an internal address). Its raw
			// "(SSRF guard)" string must never read as a red "unreachable" verdict at
			// ANY vantage - demote to an honest skip naming the blocked target

pkg/probe/probe.go:56mcp-go-ssrf-metadata-endpoint (critical/medium)

The cloud instance-metadata endpoint is contacted directly.

// denyInternalControl is a net.Dialer.Control hook that refuses DIRECT probe
// connections to loopback, unspecified (0.0.0.0/::), and link-local addresses - most importantly the
// cloud metadata endpoint 169.254.169.254. A user who can set an Ingress host
// or Gateway address could otherwise point it at an internal target and have
// Radar's probe reach it on their behalf (SSRF). Legitimate probe targets are

web/src/components/traffic/TrafficView.tsx:308mcp-js-ssrf-metadata-endpoint (critical/medium)
The cloud instance-metadata endpoint is contacted directly — the standard path from SSRF to credential theft on a hosted server.
```
    return true
  }
  if (name === 'metadata.google.internal' || name === 'metadata.google.internal.') {
    return true
  }
```
web/src/components/traffic/TrafficView.tsx:308mcp-js-ssrf-metadata-endpoint (critical/medium)
The cloud instance-metadata endpoint is contacted directly — the standard path from SSRF to credential theft on a hosted server.
```
    return true
  }
  if (name === 'metadata.google.internal' || name === 'metadata.google.internal.') {
    return true
  }
```

web/src/components/traffic/TrafficView.tsx:634mcp-js-ssrf-metadata-endpoint (critical/medium)

The cloud instance-metadata endpoint is contacted directly — the standard path from SSRF to credential theft on a hosted server.

      const isAlwaysFiltered = (name: string) =>
        // Cloud metadata services
        name === 'metadata.google.internal' ||
        name === 'metadata.google.internal.' ||
        name.startsWith('169.254.') ||

web/src/components/traffic/TrafficView.tsx:635mcp-js-ssrf-metadata-endpoint (critical/medium)

The cloud instance-metadata endpoint is contacted directly — the standard path from SSRF to credential theft on a hosted server.

        // Cloud metadata services
        name === 'metadata.google.internal' ||
        name === 'metadata.google.internal.' ||
        name.startsWith('169.254.') ||
        name === 'instance-data.ec2.internal' ||

web/src/components/traffic/TrafficView.tsx:710mcp-js-ssrf-metadata-endpoint (critical/medium)

The cloud instance-metadata endpoint is contacted directly — the standard path from SSRF to credential theft on a hosted server.


    const isAlwaysFiltered = (name: string) =>
      name === 'metadata.google.internal' || name === 'metadata.google.internal.' ||
      name.startsWith('169.254.') || name === 'instance-data.ec2.internal' ||
      name === 'localhost' || name === '127.0.0.1' || name.startsWith('127.') || name === '0.0.0.0'

web/src/components/traffic/TrafficView.tsx:710mcp-js-ssrf-metadata-endpoint (critical/medium)

The cloud instance-metadata endpoint is contacted directly — the standard path from SSRF to credential theft on a hosted server.


    const isAlwaysFiltered = (name: string) =>
      name === 'metadata.google.internal' || name === 'metadata.google.internal.' ||
      name.startsWith('169.254.') || name === 'instance-data.ec2.internal' ||
      name === 'localhost' || name === '127.0.0.1' || name.startsWith('127.') || name === '0.0.0.0'

packages/k8s-ui/src/components/resources/printer-columns.ts:88mcp-js-prototype-pollution-merge-loop (medium/medium)
Keys from a caller-supplied object are copied onto a target without excluding __proto__ / constructor / prototype. A tool argument carrying __proto__ then mutates Object.prototype for the whole process, which can turn an unrelated later property read into attacker-controlled data.
```
    // Realign to the surviving columns, or a dropped duplicate would shift
    // every later value into the wrong column.
    cells[uid] = keptIdx.map(i => row[i])
  }
  return {
```
packages/k8s-ui/src/components/resources/renderers/GenericRenderer.tsx:180mcp-js-prototype-pollution-merge-loop (medium/medium)
Keys from a caller-supplied object are copied onto a target without excluding __proto__ / constructor / prototype. A tool argument carrying __proto__ then mutates Object.prototype for the whole process, which can turn an unrelated later property read into attacker-controlled data.
```
  for (const field of priorityFields) {
    if (obj[field] !== undefined && !isComplexObject(obj[field])) {
      result[field] = obj[field]
    }
  }
```
packages/k8s-ui/src/filter-state/filter-state-core.ts:63mcp-js-prototype-pollution-merge-loop (medium/medium)
Keys from a caller-supplied object are copied onto a target without excluding __proto__ / constructor / prototype. A tool argument carrying __proto__ then mutates Object.prototype for the whole process, which can turn an unrelated later property read into attacker-controlled data.
```
    const raw = params.get(def.param)
    if (def.type === 'set') {
      ;(out[key] as Set<string>) = new Set((raw ?? '').split(',').filter(Boolean))
    } else if (def.type === 'boolean') {
      ;(out[key] as boolean) = raw === '1'
```
packages/k8s-ui/src/filter-state/filter-state-core.ts:65mcp-js-prototype-pollution-merge-loop (medium/medium)
Keys from a caller-supplied object are copied onto a target without excluding __proto__ / constructor / prototype. A tool argument carrying __proto__ then mutates Object.prototype for the whole process, which can turn an unrelated later property read into attacker-controlled data.
```
      ;(out[key] as Set<string>) = new Set((raw ?? '').split(',').filter(Boolean))
    } else if (def.type === 'boolean') {
      ;(out[key] as boolean) = raw === '1'
    } else {
      // text / single: an empty param (?f=) reads as the default, same as omission.
```
packages/k8s-ui/src/filter-state/filter-state-core.ts:68mcp-js-prototype-pollution-merge-loop (medium/medium)
Keys from a caller-supplied object are copied onto a target without excluding __proto__ / constructor / prototype. A tool argument carrying __proto__ then mutates Object.prototype for the whole process, which can turn an unrelated later property read into attacker-controlled data.
```
    } else {
      // text / single: an empty param (?f=) reads as the default, same as omission.
      ;(out[key] as string) = raw ? raw : (def.default ?? '')
    }
  }
```
packages/k8s-ui/src/utils/extended-resources.ts:45mcp-js-prototype-pollution-merge-loop (medium/medium)
Keys from a caller-supplied object are copied onto a target without excluding __proto__ / constructor / prototype. A tool argument carrying __proto__ then mutates Object.prototype for the whole process, which can turn an unrelated later property read into attacker-controlled data.
```
  for (const key of keys) {
    const value = getEffectiveResourceValue(resources, key)
    if (value !== undefined) out[key] = value
  }
  return out
```
packages/k8s-ui/src/utils/yaml.ts:81mcp-js-prototype-pollution-merge-loop (medium/medium)
Keys from a caller-supplied object are copied onto a target without excluding __proto__ / constructor / prototype. A tool argument carrying __proto__ then mutates Object.prototype for the whole process, which can turn an unrelated later property read into attacker-controlled data.
```
                Array.isArray(cleaned[field])
              ) {
                cleaned[field] = safeSecretReviewMarker(cleaned[field])
                continue
              }
```
packages/k8s-ui/src/utils/yaml.ts:85mcp-js-prototype-pollution-merge-loop (medium/medium)
Keys from a caller-supplied object are copied onto a target without excluding __proto__ / constructor / prototype. A tool argument carrying __proto__ then mutates Object.prototype for the whole process, which can turn an unrelated later property read into attacker-controlled data.
```
              }
              for (const key of Object.keys(cleaned[field])) {
                cleaned[field][key] = safeSecretReviewMarker(cleaned[field][key])
              }
            }
```
packages/k8s-ui/src/utils/yaml.ts:91mcp-js-prototype-pollution-merge-loop (medium/medium)
Keys from a caller-supplied object are copied onto a target without excluding __proto__ / constructor / prototype. A tool argument carrying __proto__ then mutates Object.prototype for the whole process, which can turn an unrelated later property read into attacker-controlled data.
```
            if (annotations && typeof annotations === 'object' && !Array.isArray(annotations)) {
              for (const key of Object.keys(annotations)) {
                annotations[key] = safeSecretReviewMarker(annotations[key])
              }
            } else if (annotations !== undefined) {
```
web/src/components/cnpg/operations/model.ts:88mcp-js-prototype-pollution-merge-loop (medium/medium)
Keys from a caller-supplied object are copied onto a target without excluding __proto__ / constructor / prototype. A tool argument carrying __proto__ then mutates Object.prototype for the whole process, which can turn an unrelated later property read into attacker-controlled data.
```
    const f = obs.freshness?.[source]
    const differentCluster = op.clusterUID && source !== 'clusterUID' && source !== 'backups' && f?.clusterUID !== op.clusterUID
    if (!f || f.failed || f.updatedAt < op.startedAt || differentCluster) out[source] = undefined
  }
  return out
```
web/src/components/cnpg/storageModel.ts:8mcp-js-prototype-pollution-merge-loop (medium/medium)
Keys from a caller-supplied object are copied onto a target without excluding __proto__ / constructor / prototype. A tool argument carrying __proto__ then mutates Object.prototype for the whole process, which can turn an unrelated later property read into attacker-controlled data.
```
  let cur = obj
  for (const p of path.slice(0, -1)) {
    cur[p] = cur[p] && typeof cur[p] === 'object' ? { ...cur[p] } : {}
    cur = cur[p]
  }
```
web/src/components/helm/InstallWizard.tsx:25mcp-js-prototype-pollution-merge-loop (medium/medium)
Keys from a caller-supplied object are copied onto a target without excluding __proto__ / constructor / prototype. A tool argument carrying __proto__ then mutates Object.prototype for the whole process, which can turn an unrelated later property read into attacker-controlled data.
```
    const overVal = overrides[key]
    if (baseVal && overVal && typeof baseVal === 'object' && typeof overVal === 'object' && !Array.isArray(baseVal) && !Array.isArray(overVal)) {
      result[key] = deepMerge(baseVal as Record<string, unknown>, overVal as Record<string, unknown>)
    } else {
      result[key] = overVal
```
web/src/components/helm/InstallWizard.tsx:27mcp-js-prototype-pollution-merge-loop (medium/medium)
Keys from a caller-supplied object are copied onto a target without excluding __proto__ / constructor / prototype. A tool argument carrying __proto__ then mutates Object.prototype for the whole process, which can turn an unrelated later property read into attacker-controlled data.
```
      result[key] = deepMerge(baseVal as Record<string, unknown>, overVal as Record<string, unknown>)
    } else {
      result[key] = overVal
    }
  }
```

internal/auth/oidc.go:314mcp-go-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)