io.github.shigechika/gws-mcp
version 0.22.5-mcp.38
- scanned 2026-10-16
- source github.com/shigechika/gws-mcp
- commit dbf35922f6e3
- transport stdio
- files read 3
- methodology 0.2.0
- ruleset 0.1.1
No tag matching version 0.22.5-mcp.38 was found in this repository, so the scan read the default branch instead. The findings below describe that code, not necessarily the released version.
95
76measured on 85% of this axis
85measured on 9% of this axis
10 vulnerabilities could not be placed in `03` §6's table and are listed but not scored
100measured on 65% of this axis
68
The evidence
Every deduction below names the artefact that produced it. Nothing on this page was executed: the source was read, never run, and no running server was contacted.
Code Safety
- npm/install.js:40mcp-js-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any part is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at internal hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.
*/ async function download(url, dest) { const res = await fetch(url, { redirect: "follow" }); if (!res.ok) {
Auth Posture
- authentication_model
stdio transport: the client launches the server as a subprocess, so the OS process boundary is the auth boundary — `03` §4 does not penalise absent auth here
- transport_security
declared transport: stdio — launched as a subprocess by the client, so the security boundary is the client process, not a network port (`03` §4)
- secret_handling
Private Key at crates/google-workspace-cli/src/auth.rs:680; …and 70 more matches
- authorization_granularity
no tool registration was recognised anywhere in the source. An MCP server registers tools by definition, so this is a gap in our detection rather than a server with none, and `03` §4's threshold cannot be applied to it.
Dependency Health
- pnpm-lock.yamlshell-quote 1.10.0 — GHSA-pqg4-j6r4-53mv
transitive, CVSS 9.2, fixed in 1.11.0
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-pqg4-j6r4-53mv - Cargo.lockquinn-proto 0.11.16 — RUSTSEC-2026-0340
direct or transitive unknown — no parseable manifest for this ecosystem, CVSS 7.5, fixed in 0.11.18
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2026-0340 - Cargo.lockquinn-proto 0.11.16 — RUSTSEC-2026-0341
direct or transitive unknown — no parseable manifest for this ecosystem, CVSS 7.5, fixed in 0.11.17
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2026-0341 - Cargo.lockrustls 0.23.45 — RUSTSEC-2026-0346
direct or transitive unknown — no parseable manifest for this ecosystem, CVSS 4.0, fixed in 0.23.46
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2026-0346 - Cargo.lockrustls 0.23.45 — RUSTSEC-2026-0348
direct or transitive unknown — no parseable manifest for this ecosystem, CVSS 3.7, fixed in 0.23.46
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2026-0348 - Cargo.lockrustls 0.23.45 — RUSTSEC-2026-0349
direct or transitive unknown — no parseable manifest for this ecosystem, CVSS 3.7, fixed in 0.23.46
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2026-0349 - Cargo.lockrustls 0.23.45 — RUSTSEC-2026-0347
direct or transitive unknown — no parseable manifest for this ecosystem, CVSS 2.3, fixed in 0.23.46
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2026-0347 - Cargo.locklru 0.16.4 — RUSTSEC-2026-0253
direct or transitive unknown — no parseable manifest for this ecosystem, no CVSS published, fixed in 0.18.2
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2026-0253 - Cargo.lockquinn-proto 0.11.16 — RUSTSEC-2026-0338
direct or transitive unknown — no parseable manifest for this ecosystem, no CVSS published, fixed in 0.11.18
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2026-0338 - Cargo.lockquinn-proto 0.11.16 — RUSTSEC-2026-0339
direct or transitive unknown — no parseable manifest for this ecosystem, no CVSS published, fixed in 0.11.17
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2026-0339 - Cargo.lockquinn-proto 0.11.16 — RUSTSEC-2026-0342
direct or transitive unknown — no parseable manifest for this ecosystem, no CVSS published, fixed in 0.11.17
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2026-0342
Maintenance
- recency
last commit 15 day(s) before 2026-10-16
- issue_responsiveness
every issue read was filed by the project itself (5 by its maintainers or bots), so none is someone outside waiting for an answer, and `03` §5's question — will anyone read an issue I file? — has nothing to measure.
- release_cadence
released 15 day(s) ago (by releases), inside `03` §5's 30-day window
- bus_factor
3 authors with >= 5 commits in 12 months
- repository_signals
`03` §5 scores this by quartile WITHIN the server's category, which needs a distribution across every scanned server and so cannot be computed while scanning one. It is a post-pass over the crawl and that pass does not exist yet.
Transparency
- license
LICENSE present with no SPDX-License-Identifier tag; identified as 'Apache-2.0' from its text
- readme_quality
README.md: installation instructions (+25), configuration documented (+25), exposed tools or resources enumerated (+30)
- declared_scopes
neither the README nor the MCP manifest documents what the server accesses or what side effects it has
- changelog
CHANGELOG.md present
- security_contact
SECURITY.md present
Contest a finding
Every number here comes from a rule reading published source, and rules get things wrong. If something on this page is incorrect — or correct but mitigated by a check the rule cannot see — open an issue and we answer it in writing. A finding we got wrong is removed and the rule is fixed; one that stands is answered on the record.
Anyone can file: the maintainer, a researcher who disagrees with the classification, or a user who tested the server and could not reproduce it. Name this server and the rule or advisory ID shown beside the finding above. We aim to reply within five business days and to resolve within ten.