io.github.olgasafonova/nordic-registry-mcp-server
version 1.0.2
- scanned 2026-10-16
- source github.com/olgasafonova/nordic-registry-mcp-server
- commit b26bc1e938b9
- transport stdio
- files read 29
- methodology 0.2.0
- ruleset 0.1.1
88
100measured on 80% of this axis
28measured on 51% of this axis
15 vulnerabilities could not be placed in `03` §6's table and are listed but not scored
100measured on 50% of this axis
72measured on 80% of this axis
The evidence
Every deduction below names the artefact that produced it. Nothing on this page was executed: the source was read, never run, and no running server was contacted.
Code Safety
- internal/base/client.go:151mcp-go-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound HTTP request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any component is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.
// Create request req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, cfg.URL, nil) if err != nil { return nil, 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to create request: %w", err) - internal/sweden/client.go:177mcp-go-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound HTTP request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any component is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.
data.Set("scope", scopeRead+" "+scopePing) req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, c.tokenURL, strings.NewReader(data.Encode())) if err != nil { return "", fmt.Errorf("sweden: creating token request: %w", err) - internal/sweden/client.go:232mcp-go-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound HTTP request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any component is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.
reqURL := c.baseURL + endpoint req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, method, reqURL, reqBody) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("sweden: creating request: %w", err) - internal/sweden/client.go:384mcp-go-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound HTTP request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any component is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.
reqURL := c.baseURL + "/dokument/" + url.PathEscape(documentID) req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, reqURL, nil) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("sweden: creating request: %w", err)
Auth Posture
- authentication_model
stdio transport: the client launches the server as a subprocess, so the OS process boundary is the auth boundary — `03` §4 does not penalise absent auth here
- transport_security
declared transport: stdio — launched as a subprocess by the client, so the security boundary is the client process, not a network port (`03` §4)
- secret_handling
detect-secrets matched 8 credential-shaped string(s), every one from a keyword or entropy heuristic (Secret Keyword). Those flag placeholders, variable names and content hashes as readily as credentials, so they do not establish the committed credential `03` §4's 0 asserts, and this sub-check is not scored; Secret Keyword at README.md:392; Secret Keyword at docs/PRODUCTION.md:250; Secret Keyword at docs/SETUP.md:85; Secret Keyword at docs/TEST_REPORT.md:353; Secret Keyword at internal/sweden/client.go:32; Secret Keyword at internal/sweden/client.go:93; Secret Keyword at internal/sweden/client_test.go:46; Secret Keyword at scripts/LocalSettings.php:24
- authorization_granularity
2 tool registration(s) detected — at or below `03` §4's threshold of 3, so there is no multi-tool surface to segregate
Dependency Health
- go.modgoogle.golang.org/grpc 1.78.0 — GO-2026-4762
transitive, CVSS 9.1, fixed in 1.79.3
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-4762 - go.modgithub.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk 1.3.0 — GO-2026-4770
direct, CVSS 8.2, fixed in 1.4.1
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-4770 - go.modgithub.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk 1.3.0 — GO-2026-5771
direct, CVSS 8.1, fixed in 1.4.0
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-5771 - go.modgo.opentelemetry.io/otel 1.40.0 — GO-2026-5506
direct, CVSS 7.5, fixed in 1.41.0
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-5506 - go.modgo.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk 1.40.0 — GO-2026-5426
direct, CVSS 7.3, fixed in 1.43.0
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-5426 - go.modgithub.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk 1.3.0 — GO-2026-4773
direct, CVSS 7.1, fixed in 1.4.1
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-4773 - go.modgithub.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk 1.3.0 — GO-2026-4569
direct, CVSS 7.0, fixed in 1.3.1
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-4569 - go.modgoogle.golang.org/grpc 1.78.0 — GO-2026-6061
transitive, CVSS 8.8, fixed in 1.82.1
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-6061 - go.modgoogle.golang.org/grpc 1.78.0 — GO-2026-6348
transitive, CVSS 8.7, fixed in 1.83.1
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-6348 - go.modgoogle.golang.org/grpc 1.78.0 — GO-2026-6443
transitive, CVSS 8.7, fixed in 1.82.2
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-6443 - go.modgo.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlptrace/otlptracehttp 1.40.0 — GO-2026-4985
direct, CVSS 5.3, fixed in 1.43.0
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-4985 - go.modgolang.org/x/net 0.49.0 — GO-2026-5028
transitive, CVSS 6.5, fixed in 0.55.0
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-5028 - go.modgoogle.golang.org/grpc 1.78.0 — GO-2026-6441
transitive, CVSS 6.3, fixed in 1.83.1
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-6441 - go.modgo.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlptrace/otlptracehttp 1.40.0 — GO-2026-6505
direct, CVSS 2.0, fixed in 1.45.0
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-6505 - go.modgo.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk 1.40.0 — GO-2026-6505
direct, CVSS 2.0, fixed in 1.45.0
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-6505 - go.modgo.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlptrace 1.40.0 — GO-2026-6505
transitive, CVSS 2.0, fixed in 1.45.0
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-6505 - go.modgolang.org/x/net 0.49.0 — GO-2026-4918
transitive, no CVSS published, fixed in 0.53.0
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-4918 - go.modgolang.org/x/net 0.49.0 — GO-2026-5025
transitive, no CVSS published, fixed in 0.55.0
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-5025 - go.modgolang.org/x/net 0.49.0 — GO-2026-5026
transitive, no CVSS published, fixed in 0.55.0
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-5026 - go.modgolang.org/x/net 0.49.0 — GO-2026-5027
transitive, no CVSS published, fixed in 0.55.0
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-5027 - go.modgolang.org/x/net 0.49.0 — GO-2026-5029
transitive, no CVSS published, fixed in 0.55.0
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-5029 - go.modgolang.org/x/net 0.49.0 — GO-2026-5030
transitive, no CVSS published, fixed in 0.55.0
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-5030 - go.modgolang.org/x/net 0.49.0 — GO-2026-5942
transitive, no CVSS published, fixed in 0.56.0
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-5942 - go.modgolang.org/x/net 0.49.0 — GO-2026-6603
transitive, no CVSS published, fixed in 0.60.0
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-6603 - go.modgolang.org/x/net 0.49.0 — GO-2026-6610
transitive, no CVSS published, fixed in 0.60.0
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-6610 - go.modgolang.org/x/net 0.49.0 — GO-2026-6611
transitive, no CVSS published, fixed in 0.60.0
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-6611 - go.modgolang.org/x/net 0.49.0 — GO-2026-6612
transitive, no CVSS published, fixed in 0.60.0
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-6612 - go.modgolang.org/x/net 0.49.0 — GO-2026-6617
transitive, no CVSS published, fixed in 0.60.0
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-6617 - go.modgolang.org/x/sys 0.40.0 — GO-2026-5024
transitive, no CVSS published, fixed in 0.44.0
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-5024 - go.modgolang.org/x/text 0.33.0 — GO-2026-5970
transitive, no CVSS published, fixed in 0.39.0
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-5970 - go.modgolang.org/x/text 0.33.0 — GO-2026-6629
transitive, no CVSS published, fixed in 0.41.0
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-6629
Maintenance
- recency
last commit 2 day(s) before 2026-10-16
- issue_responsiveness
every issue read was filed by the project itself (9 by its maintainers or bots), so none is someone outside waiting for an answer, and `03` §5's question — will anyone read an issue I file? — has nothing to measure.
- release_cadence
median release gap 22 days (by releases), last release 166 day(s) ago
- bus_factor
this repository's 12-month history is longer than the bounded walk `04` §7 performs, and the authors found so far span more than one of `03` §5's bands. A limit of ours, not a finding about the server.
- repository_signals
`03` §5 scores this by quartile WITHIN the server's category, which needs a distribution across every scanned server and so cannot be computed while scanning one. It is a post-pass over the crawl and that pass does not exist yet.
Transparency
- license
LICENSE present with no SPDX-License-Identifier tag; identified as 'Apache-2.0' from its text
- readme_quality
README.md: installation instructions (+25), configuration documented (+25), exposed tools or resources enumerated (+30), states what the server does in the first 200 words (+20)
- declared_scopes
specific scope or access documentation is present, but `03` §7's 100 and 60 bands both compare it against scopes INFERRED from static analysis, which is not built yet. Scoring 100 on an empty inference would be a vacuous truth — 'all ∅ inferred scopes are documented'.
- changelog
no CHANGELOG in the fetched source. `03` §7's partial credit for tagged releases carrying release notes is not applied here — that needs the forge API, which this check does not call
- security_contact
SECURITY.md present
Contest a finding
Every number here comes from a rule reading published source, and rules get things wrong. If something on this page is incorrect — or correct but mitigated by a check the rule cannot see — open an issue and we answer it in writing. A finding we got wrong is removed and the rule is fixed; one that stands is answered on the record.
Anyone can file: the maintainer, a researcher who disagrees with the classification, or a user who tested the server and could not reproduce it. Name this server and the rule or advisory ID shown beside the finding above. We aim to reply within five business days and to resolve within ten.