io.github.ofershap/devutils
version 1.0.2
- scanned 2026-10-16
- source github.com/ofershap/mcp-server-devutils
- commit 3f8f61505a3b
- transport stdio
- files read 12
- methodology 0.2.0
- ruleset 0.1.1
95
scored on the declared repository, because the published package carries its code only as build output, which is not read as the server's own source; no tag matched this version, so the repository's default branch was read and the findings describe that code, not necessarily the release
100measured on 65% of this axis
not assessed
no lockfile in the fetched source; dependency versions are unresolved, so no vulnerability can be attributed
19measured on 70% of this axis
43
The evidence
Every deduction below names the artefact that produced it. Nothing on this page was executed: the source was read, never run, and no running server was contacted.
Code Safety
- src/tools/hash.ts:23mcp-js-prototype-pollution-merge-loop (medium/medium)
Keys from a caller-supplied object are copied onto a target without excluding __proto__ / constructor / prototype. A tool argument carrying __proto__ then mutates Object.prototype for the whole process, which can turn an unrelated later property read into attacker-controlled data.
const result = {} as Record<HashAlgorithm, string>; for (const algo of SUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS) { result[algo] = hash(input, algo); } return result;
Auth Posture
- authentication_model
stdio transport: the client launches the server as a subprocess, so the OS process boundary is the auth boundary — `03` §4 does not penalise absent auth here
- transport_security
declared transport: stdio — launched as a subprocess by the client, so the security boundary is the client process, not a network port (`03` §4)
- secret_handling
detect-secrets matched 1 credential-shaped string(s), every one from a keyword or entropy heuristic (Base64 High Entropy String). Those flag placeholders, variable names and content hashes as readily as credentials, so they do not establish the committed credential `03` §4's 0 asserts, and this sub-check is not scored; Base64 High Entropy String at dist/index.js:27
- authorization_granularity
source was fetched but every file in it was oversized, unreadable or excluded, so no source text could be read, so neither the tool count nor any access-control logic can be read
Maintenance
- recency
last commit 220 day(s) before 2026-10-16
- issue_responsiveness
lifetime median (0 issue(s) in the last 6 months, under `03` §5's floor of 3): 242.7 day(s) to first maintainer comment
- release_cadence
a release exists but fewer than two fall inside `03` §5's 12-month window, so no median gap can be taken — and §5's remaining bands are all defined on that median. A limit of the methodology, not of this repository.
- bus_factor
sole maintainer, and no commit in over 90 days
- repository_signals
`03` §5 scores this by quartile WITHIN the server's category, which needs a distribution across every scanned server and so cannot be computed while scanning one. It is a post-pass over the crawl and that pass does not exist yet.
Transparency
- license
LICENSE present with no SPDX-License-Identifier tag; identified as 'MIT' from its text
- readme_quality
README.md: installation instructions (+25), configuration documented (+25), exposed tools or resources enumerated (+30), states what the server does in the first 200 words (+20)
- declared_scopes
neither the README nor the MCP manifest documents what the server accesses or what side effects it has
- changelog
no CHANGELOG in the fetched source. `03` §7's partial credit for tagged releases carrying release notes is not applied here — that needs the forge API, which this check does not call
- security_contact
no SECURITY.md and no disclosure contact in the README, so a finder has no route to report a vulnerability privately
Contest a finding
Every number here comes from a rule reading published source, and rules get things wrong. If something on this page is incorrect — or correct but mitigated by a check the rule cannot see — open an issue and we answer it in writing. A finding we got wrong is removed and the rule is fixed; one that stands is answered on the record.
Anyone can file: the maintainer, a researcher who disagrees with the classification, or a user who tested the server and could not reproduce it. Name this server and the rule or advisory ID shown beside the finding above. We aim to reply within five business days and to resolve within ten.