io.github.nirholas/3d-agent-mcp

The evidence

Every deduction below names the artefact that produced it. Nothing on this page was executed: the source was read, never run, and no running server was contacted.

Code Safety

• src/lib/resilient-fetch.js:127mcp-js-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)

  An outbound request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any part is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at internal hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.

  
  		try {
  			const res = await fetch(url, { ...init, signal: controller.signal });
  
  			// Retry on transient status codes if attempts remain and the method

• src/tools/_news-core.js:31mcp-js-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)

  An outbound request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any part is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at internal hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.

  	let resp;
  	try {
  		resp = await fetch(url, {
  			headers: { accept: 'application/json', 'user-agent': 'three.ws-mcp-news/1.0' },
  			signal: AbortSignal.timeout(timeoutMs),

• src/tools/_studio-core.js:61mcp-js-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)

  An outbound request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any part is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at internal hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.

  	if (!url) return false;
  	try {
  		const r = await fetch(url, {
  			method: 'GET',
  			headers: { range: 'bytes=0-0' },

• src/tools/_studio-core.js:1005mcp-js-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)

  An outbound request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any part is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at internal hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.

  	if (!ingestKey) return null;
  	try {
  		const r = await fetch(endpoint, {
  			method: 'POST',
  			headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json', authorization: `Bearer ${ingestKey}` },

Auth Posture

• authentication_model

  stdio transport: the client launches the server as a subprocess, so the OS process boundary is the auth boundary — `03` §4 does not penalise absent auth here

• transport_security

  declared transport: stdio — launched as a subprocess by the client, so the security boundary is the client process, not a network port (`03` §4)

• secret_handling

  detect-secrets matched 10 credential-shaped string(s), every one from a keyword or entropy heuristic (Base64 High Entropy String, Secret Keyword). Those flag placeholders, variable names and content hashes as readily as credentials, so they do not establish the committed credential `03` §4's 0 asserts, and this sub-check is not scored; Base64 High Entropy String at src/lib/base58-distribution.js:21; Base64 High Entropy String at src/lib/pump-vanity.js:16; Base64 High Entropy String at src/payments.js:35; Base64 High Entropy String at src/payments.js:118; Base64 High Entropy String at src/tools/agenc-client.js:20; Base64 High Entropy String at src/tools/agenc-list-tasks.js:50; Base64 High Entropy String at src/tools/pump-snapshot.js:201; Base64 High Entropy String at src/tools/sentiment-pulse.js:63; Secret Keyword at src/tools/vanity-grinder.js:131; Base64 High Entropy String at src/ui/commerce-receipt.html:124

• authorization_granularity

  4 tool registrations and no conditional access logic found — `03` §4 calls this case 'needs human review' and assigns it no score band, so it is not scored here

Maintenance

• recency

  last commit 3 day(s) before 2026-10-16

• issue_responsiveness

  median over 19 issue(s) in the last 6 months: 78.9 day(s) to first maintainer comment

• release_cadence

  released 5 day(s) ago (by releases), inside `03` §5's 30-day window

• bus_factor

  this repository's 12-month history is longer than the bounded walk `04` §7 performs, and the authors found so far span more than one of `03` §5's bands. A limit of ours, not a finding about the server.

• repository_signals

  `03` §5 scores this by quartile WITHIN the server's category, which needs a distribution across every scanned server and so cannot be computed while scanning one. It is a post-pass over the crawl and that pass does not exist yet.

Transparency

• license

  LICENSE present with no SPDX-License-Identifier tag; text not matched against any license this build can identify (`04` §7's classifier is not wired; see module docstring)

• readme_quality

  README.md: installation instructions (+25), configuration documented (+25), exposed tools or resources enumerated (+30)

• declared_scopes

  specific scope or access documentation is present, but `03` §7's 100 and 60 bands both compare it against scopes INFERRED from static analysis, which is not built yet. Scoring 100 on an empty inference would be a vacuous truth — 'all ∅ inferred scopes are documented'.

• changelog

  no CHANGELOG in the fetched source. `03` §7's partial credit for tagged releases carrying release notes is not applied here — that needs the forge API, which this check does not call

• security_contact

  no SECURITY.md and no disclosure contact in the README, so a finder has no route to report a vulnerability privately