io.github.jascal/orca-mcp-server

The evidence

Every deduction below names the artefact that produced it. Nothing on this page was executed: the source was read, never run, and no running server was contacted.

Code Safety

• src/server.ts:231mcp-js-path-join-unvalidated (medium/low)

  A filesystem path is assembled from a non-literal and read or written without confinement. path.join does not resolve away `..`, and path.resolve discards the base entirely on an absolute second component.

    if (!grammarSpecContent) {
      try {
        grammarSpecContent = readFileSync(resolve(__dirname, '../../../docs/orca-md-grammar-spec.md'), 'utf-8');
      } catch {
        grammarSpecContent = '# Orca Grammar Specification\n\nGrammar spec not found. See AGENTS.md for syntax reference.';

• src/server.ts:283mcp-js-path-join-unvalidated (medium/low)

  A filesystem path is assembled from a non-literal and read or written without confinement. path.join does not resolve away `..`, and path.resolve discards the base entirely on an absolute second component.

      if (example) {
        try {
          const content = readFileSync(resolve(EXAMPLES_DIR, example.file), 'utf-8');
          return {
            contents: [{

Auth Posture

• authentication_model

  stdio transport: the client launches the server as a subprocess, so the OS process boundary is the auth boundary — `03` §4 does not penalise absent auth here

• transport_security

  declared transport: stdio — launched as a subprocess by the client, so the security boundary is the client process, not a network port (`03` §4)

• secret_handling

  source was fetched but every file in it was oversized, unreadable or excluded, so no source text could be read, so there is nothing to scan for committed credentials

• authorization_granularity

  source was fetched but every file in it was oversized, unreadable or excluded, so no source text could be read, so neither the tool count nor any access-control logic can be read

Maintenance

• recency

  last commit 135 day(s) before 2026-10-16

• issue_responsiveness

  every issue read was filed by the project itself (1 by its maintainers or bots), so none is someone outside waiting for an answer, and `03` §5's question — will anyone read an issue I file? — has nothing to measure.

• release_cadence

  median release gap 0 days (by releases), last release 135 day(s) ago

• bus_factor

  sole maintainer, and no commit in over 90 days

• repository_signals

  `03` §5 scores this by quartile WITHIN the server's category, which needs a distribution across every scanned server and so cannot be computed while scanning one. It is a post-pass over the crawl and that pass does not exist yet.

Transparency

• license

  package.json declares 'Apache-2.0' but no LICENSE file ships with the source

• readme_quality

  no README in the fetched source

• declared_scopes

  neither the README nor the MCP manifest documents what the server accesses or what side effects it has

• changelog

  no CHANGELOG in the fetched source. `03` §7's partial credit for tagged releases carrying release notes is not applied here — that needs the forge API, which this check does not call

• security_contact

  no SECURITY.md and no disclosure contact in the README, so a finder has no route to report a vulnerability privately