io.github.DekryptLabs/dlbrowser
version 4.0.2
- scanned 2026-10-16
- source github.com/DekryptLabs/dlbrowser
- transport stdio
- files read 78
- methodology 0.2.0
- ruleset 0.1.1
85
100measured on 65% of this axis
not assessed
no lockfile in the fetched source; dependency versions are unresolved, so no vulnerability can be attributed
70measured on 45% of this axis
23
The evidence
Every deduction below names the artefact that produced it. Nothing on this page was executed: the source was read, never run, and no running server was contacted.
Code Safety
- src/hermes_browser/__main__.py:108mcp-python-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound HTTP request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any part of it is caller-supplied, the server can be steered at internal hosts — cloud metadata endpoints, admin ports, other tenants.
try: req = urllib.request.Request(url, method="GET") with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=2) as resp: if resp.status == 200: print(f"DLBrowser gateway started (PID {proc.pid})") - src/hermes_browser/cli.py:541mcp-python-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound HTTP request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any part of it is caller-supplied, the server can be steered at internal hosts — cloud metadata endpoints, admin ports, other tenants.
try: req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={"Accept": "application/vnd.github.v3+json", "User-Agent": "dlbrowser-cli"}) with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=15) as resp: data = json_lib.loads(resp.read().decode("utf-8")) except Exception as exc: - src/hermes_browser/cli.py:603mcp-python-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound HTTP request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any part of it is caller-supplied, the server can be steered at internal hosts — cloud metadata endpoints, admin ports, other tenants.
url = f"https://api.github.com/repos/{GITHUB_REPO}/releases/latest" req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={"Accept": "application/vnd.github.v3+json", "User-Agent": "dlbrowser-cli"}) with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=10) as resp: data = json_lib.loads(resp.read().decode("utf-8")) latest_tag = data.get("tag_name", "").lstrip("v") - src/hermes_browser/deep_crawl.py:123mcp-python-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound HTTP request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any part of it is caller-supplied, the server can be steered at internal hosts — cloud metadata endpoints, admin ports, other tenants.
try: import urllib.request resp = urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=15) content = resp.read().decode("utf-8", errors="ignore") - src/hermes_browser/hermes_ds_fallback.py:80mcp-python-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound HTTP request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any part of it is caller-supplied, the server can be steered at internal hosts — cloud metadata endpoints, admin ports, other tenants.
) resp = urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) data = json.loads(resp.read().decode("utf-8")) - src/hermes_browser/hermes_ds_fallback.py:138mcp-python-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound HTTP request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any part of it is caller-supplied, the server can be steered at internal hosts — cloud metadata endpoints, admin ports, other tenants.
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {api_key}"}, ) resp = urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=10) return json.loads(resp.read().decode("utf-8")) except Exception as e: - src/hermes_browser/llm_manager.py:309mcp-python-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound HTTP request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any part of it is caller-supplied, the server can be steered at internal hosts — cloud metadata endpoints, admin ports, other tenants.
loop = asyncio.get_event_loop() resp = await asyncio.wait_for( loop.run_in_executor(None, lambda: urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=120)), timeout=130, ) - src/hermes_browser/mcp_server.py:695mcp-python-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound HTTP request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any part of it is caller-supplied, the server can be steered at internal hosts — cloud metadata endpoints, admin ports, other tenants.
headers={"User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7)"} ) resp = urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=15) html = resp.read().decode("utf-8", errors="ignore") - src/hermes_browser/smart_content.py:295mcp-python-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound HTTP request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any part of it is caller-supplied, the server can be steered at internal hosts — cloud metadata endpoints, admin ports, other tenants.
) resp = urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=60) data = json.loads(resp.read().decode("utf-8")) content = data["choices"][0]["message"]["content"] - src/hermes_browser/webhooks.py:263mcp-python-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound HTTP request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any part of it is caller-supplied, the server can be steered at internal hosts — cloud metadata endpoints, admin ports, other tenants.
) try: resp = urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=self.timeout) return resp.getcode() except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
Auth Posture
- authentication_model
stdio transport: the client launches the server as a subprocess, so the OS process boundary is the auth boundary — `03` §4 does not penalise absent auth here
- transport_security
declared transport: stdio — launched as a subprocess by the client, so the security boundary is the client process, not a network port (`03` §4)
- secret_handling
detect-secrets matched 3 credential-shaped string(s), every one from a keyword or entropy heuristic (Basic Auth Credentials, Secret Keyword). Those flag placeholders, variable names and content hashes as readily as credentials, so they do not establish the committed credential `03` §4's 0 asserts, and this sub-check is not scored; Basic Auth Credentials at src/hermes_browser/proxy_pool.py:8; Secret Keyword at tests/test_webhooks.py:27; Secret Keyword at tests/test_webhooks.py:219
- authorization_granularity
no tool registration was recognised anywhere in the source. An MCP server registers tools by definition, so this is a gap in our detection rather than a server with none, and `03` §4's threshold cannot be applied to it.
Maintenance
- recency
last commit 86 day(s) before 2026-10-16
- issue_responsiveness
this repository has no issues `03` §5's window covers. An unanswered issue scores 0 under §5, but a repository with no issues filed has not failed to answer one.
- release_cadence
this repository publishes neither releases nor version tags
- bus_factor
sole maintainer
- repository_signals
`03` §5 scores this by quartile WITHIN the server's category, which needs a distribution across every scanned server and so cannot be computed while scanning one. It is a post-pass over the crawl and that pass does not exist yet.
Transparency
- license
LICENSE present with no SPDX-License-Identifier tag; identified as 'MIT' from its text
- readme_quality
README.md: states what the server does in the first 200 words (+20)
- declared_scopes
neither the README nor the MCP manifest documents what the server accesses or what side effects it has
- changelog
no CHANGELOG in the fetched source. `03` §7's partial credit for tagged releases carrying release notes is not applied here — that needs the forge API, which this check does not call
- security_contact
no SECURITY.md and no disclosure contact in the README, so a finder has no route to report a vulnerability privately
Contest a finding
Every number here comes from a rule reading published source, and rules get things wrong. If something on this page is incorrect — or correct but mitigated by a check the rule cannot see — open an issue and we answer it in writing. A finding we got wrong is removed and the rule is fixed; one that stands is answered on the record.
Anyone can file: the maintainer, a researcher who disagrees with the classification, or a user who tested the server and could not reproduce it. Name this server and the rule or advisory ID shown beside the finding above. We aim to reply within five business days and to resolve within ten.