io.github.AutomateLab-tech/citation-intelligence

The evidence

Every deduction below names the artefact that produced it. Nothing on this page was executed: the source was read, never run, and no running server was contacted.

Code Safety

• src/resources.ts:145mcp-js-prototype-pollution-merge-loop (medium/medium)

  Keys from a caller-supplied object are copied onto a target without excluding __proto__ / constructor / prototype. A tool argument carrying __proto__ then mutates Object.prototype for the whole process, which can turn an unrelated later property read into attacker-controlled data.

        try {
          const files = await readdir(join(snapshotDir, p));
          snapshotsByPanel[p] = files.filter((f) => f.endsWith(".json")).length;
        } catch {
          // skip

• src/lib/fetch.ts:127mcp-js-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)

  An outbound request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any part is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at internal hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.

      const timer = setTimeout(() => ac.abort(), timeoutMs);
      try {
        const res = await request(url, {
          method,
          headers: { "user-agent": "citation-intelligence-mcp/0.5", ...headers },

• src/lib/fetch.ts:175mcp-js-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)

  An outbound request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any part is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at internal hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.

      const timer = setTimeout(() => ac.abort(), timeoutMs);
      try {
        const res = await request(url, {
          method,
          headers: { "user-agent": "citation-intelligence-mcp/0.5", ...headers },

Auth Posture

• authentication_model

  stdio transport: the client launches the server as a subprocess, so the OS process boundary is the auth boundary — `03` §4 does not penalise absent auth here

• transport_security

  declared transport: stdio — launched as a subprocess by the client, so the security boundary is the client process, not a network port (`03` §4)

• secret_handling

  detect-secrets matched 4 credential-shaped string(s), every one from a keyword or entropy heuristic (Secret Keyword). Those flag placeholders, variable names and content hashes as readily as credentials, so they do not establish the committed credential `03` §4's 0 asserts, and this sub-check is not scored; Secret Keyword at README.md:174; Secret Keyword at README.md:176; Secret Keyword at README.md:177; Secret Keyword at smithery.yaml:37

• authorization_granularity

  source was fetched but every file in it was oversized, unreadable or excluded, so no source text could be read, so neither the tool count nor any access-control logic can be read

Maintenance

• recency

  last commit 3 day(s) before 2026-10-16

• issue_responsiveness

  lifetime median (1 issue(s) in the last 6 months, under `03` §5's floor of 3): 12.5 day(s) to first maintainer comment

• release_cadence

  released 3 day(s) ago (by releases), inside `03` §5's 30-day window

• bus_factor

  sole maintainer

• repository_signals

  `03` §5 scores this by quartile WITHIN the server's category, which needs a distribution across every scanned server and so cannot be computed while scanning one. It is a post-pass over the crawl and that pass does not exist yet.

Transparency

• license

  LICENSE present with no SPDX-License-Identifier tag; identified as 'MIT' from its text

• readme_quality

  README.md: installation instructions (+25), configuration documented (+25), exposed tools or resources enumerated (+30), states what the server does in the first 200 words (+20)

• declared_scopes

  specific scope or access documentation is present, but `03` §7's 100 and 60 bands both compare it against scopes INFERRED from static analysis, which is not built yet. Scoring 100 on an empty inference would be a vacuous truth — 'all ∅ inferred scopes are documented'.

• changelog

  no CHANGELOG in the fetched source. `03` §7's partial credit for tagged releases carrying release notes is not applied here — that needs the forge API, which this check does not call

• security_contact

  no SECURITY.md, but README.md documents a disclosure route — `03` §7 accepts either