io.alterlab/mcp-server

The evidence

Every deduction below names the artefact that produced it. Nothing on this page was executed: the source was read, never run, and no running server was contacted.

Code Safety

• src/client.ts:118mcp-js-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)

  An outbound request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any part is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at internal hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.

      };
  
      const response = await fetch(url, {
        method,
        headers,

• src/client.ts:340mcp-js-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)

  An outbound request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any part is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at internal hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.

        : `${this.apiUrl}${screenshotUrl}`;
  
      const response = await fetch(fullUrl, {
        headers: {
          "X-API-Key": this.apiKey,

Auth Posture

• authentication_model

  stdio transport: the client launches the server as a subprocess, so the OS process boundary is the auth boundary — `03` §4 does not penalise absent auth here

• transport_security

  declared transport: stdio — launched as a subprocess by the client, so the security boundary is the client process, not a network port (`03` §4)

• secret_handling

  detect-secrets matched 4 credential-shaped string(s), every one from a keyword or entropy heuristic (Secret Keyword). Those flag placeholders, variable names and content hashes as readily as credentials, so they do not establish the committed credential `03` §4's 0 asserts, and this sub-check is not scored; Secret Keyword at README.md:92; Secret Keyword at dist/auth.js:370; Secret Keyword at dist/config.js:62; Secret Keyword at dist/index.js:102

• authorization_granularity

  24 tool registrations and no conditional access logic found — `03` §4 calls this case 'needs human review' and assigns it no score band, so it is not scored here

Maintenance

• recency

  last commit 80 day(s) before 2026-10-16

• issue_responsiveness

  only 0 issue(s) from outside the project fall inside `03` §5's 6-month window, which is under §5's floor of 3, and §5's lifetime-median fallback needs this repository's whole issue history — more of it than `04` §7's bounded fetch reads. A limit of ours, not a finding about the server.

• release_cadence

  median release gap 9 days (by releases), last release 100 day(s) ago

• bus_factor

  sole maintainer

• repository_signals

  `03` §5 scores this by quartile WITHIN the server's category, which needs a distribution across every scanned server and so cannot be computed while scanning one. It is a post-pass over the crawl and that pass does not exist yet.

Transparency

• license

  LICENSE present with no SPDX-License-Identifier tag; identified as 'MIT' from its text

• readme_quality

  README.md: installation instructions (+25), configuration documented (+25), exposed tools or resources enumerated (+30), states what the server does in the first 200 words (+20)

• declared_scopes

  neither the README nor the MCP manifest documents what the server accesses or what side effects it has

• changelog

  no CHANGELOG in the fetched source. `03` §7's partial credit for tagged releases carrying release notes is not applied here — that needs the forge API, which this check does not call

• security_contact

  no SECURITY.md and no disclosure contact in the README, so a finder has no route to report a vulnerability privately