com.uibeats/mcp
version 0.1.3
- scanned 2026-10-16
- source github.com/nikhils4/ui-beats
- commit e1c367ac0a62
- transport stdio
- files read 2
- methodology 0.2.0
- ruleset 0.1.1
91
scored on the declared repository, because the published package carries its code only as build output, which is not read as the server's own source; no tag matched this version, so the repository's default branch was read and the findings describe that code, not necessarily the release
100measured on 65% of this axis
not assessed
no lockfile in the fetched source; dependency versions are unresolved, so no vulnerability can be attributed
85measured on 90% of this axis
43
The evidence
Every deduction below names the artefact that produced it. Nothing on this page was executed: the source was read, never run, and no running server was contacted.
Code Safety
- src/catalogue.ts:60mcp-js-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any part is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at internal hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.
async function fetchJson(url: string): Promise<unknown> { const response = await fetch(url, { headers: { accept: "application/json" }, }); - src/catalogue.ts:106mcp-js-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any part is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at internal hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.
// catalogue, so pointing at localhost actually stays on localhost. const url = `${ORIGIN}/docs/${entry.category}/${entry.name}.md`; const response = await fetch(url, { headers: { accept: "text/markdown" } }); if (!response.ok) { throw new Error(
Auth Posture
- authentication_model
stdio transport: the client launches the server as a subprocess, so the OS process boundary is the auth boundary — `03` §4 does not penalise absent auth here
- transport_security
declared transport: stdio — launched as a subprocess by the client, so the security boundary is the client process, not a network port (`03` §4)
- secret_handling
source was fetched but every file in it was oversized, unreadable or excluded, so no source text could be read, so there is nothing to scan for committed credentials
- authorization_granularity
source was fetched but every file in it was oversized, unreadable or excluded, so no source text could be read, so neither the tool count nor any access-control logic can be read
Maintenance
- recency
last commit 61 day(s) before 2026-10-16
- issue_responsiveness
lifetime median (0 issue(s) in the last 6 months, under `03` §5's floor of 3): 0.6 day(s) to first maintainer comment
- release_cadence
median release gap 4 days (by tags), last release 54 day(s) ago
- bus_factor
sole maintainer
- repository_signals
`03` §5 scores this by quartile WITHIN the server's category, which needs a distribution across every scanned server and so cannot be computed while scanning one. It is a post-pass over the crawl and that pass does not exist yet.
Transparency
- license
LICENSE.md present with no SPDX-License-Identifier tag; identified as 'MIT' from its text
- readme_quality
README.md: installation instructions (+25), configuration documented (+25), exposed tools or resources enumerated (+30), states what the server does in the first 200 words (+20)
- declared_scopes
neither the README nor the MCP manifest documents what the server accesses or what side effects it has
- changelog
no CHANGELOG in the fetched source. `03` §7's partial credit for tagged releases carrying release notes is not applied here — that needs the forge API, which this check does not call
- security_contact
no SECURITY.md and no disclosure contact in the README, so a finder has no route to report a vulnerability privately
Contest a finding
Every number here comes from a rule reading published source, and rules get things wrong. If something on this page is incorrect — or correct but mitigated by a check the rule cannot see — open an issue and we answer it in writing. A finding we got wrong is removed and the rule is fixed; one that stands is answered on the record.
Anyone can file: the maintainer, a researcher who disagrees with the classification, or a user who tested the server and could not reproduce it. Name this server and the rule or advisory ID shown beside the finding above. We aim to reply within five business days and to resolve within ten.