ai.tensorfeed/x402-base-mcp
version 0.2.1
- scanned 2026-10-16
- source github.com/RipperMercs/tensorfeed-x402-base-mcp
- commit 48673d0e5663
- transport stdio
- files read 13
- methodology 0.2.0
- ruleset 0.1.1
89
scored on the declared repository at version 0.2.1, because the published package carries its code only as build output, which is not read as the server's own source
100measured on 85% of this axis
not assessed
no lockfile in the fetched source; dependency versions are unresolved, so no vulnerability can be attributed
69measured on 90% of this axis
91measured on 80% of this axis
The evidence
Every deduction below names the artefact that produced it. Nothing on this page was executed: the source was read, never run, and no running server was contacted.
Code Safety
- src/tools/tf.ts:91mcp-js-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any part is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at internal hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.
const url = `${TF_AFTA_CERT_ENDPOINT}?domain=${encodeURIComponent(domain)}`; try { const res = await fetch(url, { method: 'GET', headers: { - src/tools/x402.ts:185mcp-js-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any part is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at internal hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.
const url = `https://${domain}${path}`; try { const res = await fetch(url, { method: 'GET', headers: { - src/tools/x402.ts:303mcp-js-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any part is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at internal hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.
let res: Response; try { res = await fetch(url, { method: 'GET', headers: {
Auth Posture
- authentication_model
stdio transport: the client launches the server as a subprocess, so the OS process boundary is the auth boundary — `03` §4 does not penalise absent auth here
- transport_security
declared transport: stdio — launched as a subprocess by the client, so the security boundary is the client process, not a network port (`03` §4)
- secret_handling
no committed credential found, and no environment variable with a credential-shaped name is read anywhere in the source
- authorization_granularity
no tool registration was recognised anywhere in the source. An MCP server registers tools by definition, so this is a gap in our detection rather than a server with none, and `03` §4's threshold cannot be applied to it.
Maintenance
- recency
last commit 2 day(s) before 2026-10-16
- issue_responsiveness
lifetime median (2 issue(s) in the last 6 months, under `03` §5's floor of 3): 108.7 day(s) to first maintainer comment
- release_cadence
median release gap 0 days (by tags), last release 141 day(s) ago
- bus_factor
2 regular authors in the last 12 months
- repository_signals
`03` §5 scores this by quartile WITHIN the server's category, which needs a distribution across every scanned server and so cannot be computed while scanning one. It is a post-pass over the crawl and that pass does not exist yet.
Transparency
- license
LICENSE present with no SPDX-License-Identifier tag; identified as 'MIT' from its text
- readme_quality
README.md: installation instructions (+25), configuration documented (+25), exposed tools or resources enumerated (+30), states what the server does in the first 200 words (+20)
- declared_scopes
specific scope or access documentation is present, but `03` §7's 100 and 60 bands both compare it against scopes INFERRED from static analysis, which is not built yet. Scoring 100 on an empty inference would be a vacuous truth — 'all ∅ inferred scopes are documented'.
- changelog
CHANGELOG.md present
- security_contact
SECURITY.md present
Contest a finding
Every number here comes from a rule reading published source, and rules get things wrong. If something on this page is incorrect — or correct but mitigated by a check the rule cannot see — open an issue and we answer it in writing. A finding we got wrong is removed and the rule is fixed; one that stands is answered on the record.
Anyone can file: the maintainer, a researcher who disagrees with the classification, or a user who tested the server and could not reproduce it. Name this server and the rule or advisory ID shown beside the finding above. We aim to reply within five business days and to resolve within ten.