ai.meetsquad/squad

The evidence

Every deduction below names the artefact that produced it. Nothing on this page was executed: the source was read, never run, and no running server was contacted.

Code Safety

• src/lib/squad-api-client.ts:50mcp-js-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)

  An outbound request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any part is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at internal hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.

    }
  
    const response = await fetch(getSquadGraphqlUrl(), {
      method: "POST",
      headers,

Auth Posture

• authentication_model

  auth enforcement present at a call site in the source (inbound token verification) and documented in the README; "refused without credentials" (`03` §4) established by reading the code rather than by connecting

• transport_security

  declared endpoint(s) are HTTPS: https://mcp.meetsquad.ai/mcp; scored 80, not 100: `03` §4 reserves 100 for HTTPS *with HSTS*, and an HSTS header can only be seen by connecting, which `04` §9 does not do. This is an unverifiable band, not an observed absence.

• secret_handling

  detect-secrets matched 535 credential-shaped string(s), every one from a keyword or entropy heuristic (Base64 High Entropy String, Hex High Entropy String, Secret Keyword). Those flag placeholders, variable names and content hashes as readily as credentials, so they do not establish the committed credential `03` §4's 0 asserts, and this sub-check is not scored; Hex High Entropy String at .github/workflows/secret-scan.yml:35; Base64 High Entropy String at pnpm-lock.yaml:99; Base64 High Entropy String at pnpm-lock.yaml:104; Base64 High Entropy String at pnpm-lock.yaml:108; Base64 High Entropy String at pnpm-lock.yaml:112; Base64 High Entropy String at pnpm-lock.yaml:116; Base64 High Entropy String at pnpm-lock.yaml:120; Base64 High Entropy String at pnpm-lock.yaml:124; Base64 High Entropy String at pnpm-lock.yaml:128; Base64 High Entropy String at pnpm-lock.yaml:132; …and 525 more matches

• authorization_granularity

  30 tool registrations with conditional access logic present in the same source

Dependency Health

• pnpm-lock.yamlbraces 3.0.3 — GHSA-vfj7-8cjw-p6xm

  transitive, CVSS 8.7

  https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-vfj7-8cjw-p6xm
• pnpm-lock.yaml@graphql-tools/utils 11.2.0 — GHSA-7mx3-vvmw-hjmv

  transitive, CVSS 8.2, fixed in 12.0.1

  https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-7mx3-vvmw-hjmv

Maintenance

• recency

  last commit 3 day(s) before 2026-10-16

• issue_responsiveness

  lifetime median (2 issue(s) in the last 6 months, under `03` §5's floor of 3): 58.3 day(s) to first maintainer comment

• release_cadence

  released 3 day(s) ago (by releases), inside `03` §5's 30-day window

• bus_factor

  3 authors with >= 5 commits in 12 months

• repository_signals

  `03` §5 scores this by quartile WITHIN the server's category, which needs a distribution across every scanned server and so cannot be computed while scanning one. It is a post-pass over the crawl and that pass does not exist yet.

Transparency

• license

  package.json declares 'MIT' but no LICENSE file ships with the source

• readme_quality

  README.md: installation instructions (+25), configuration documented (+25), exposed tools or resources enumerated (+30), states what the server does in the first 200 words (+20)

• declared_scopes

  neither the README nor the MCP manifest documents what the server accesses or what side effects it has

• changelog

  CHANGELOG.md present

• security_contact

  no SECURITY.md and no disclosure contact in the README, so a finder has no route to report a vulnerability privately