ai.markettrace/agent-feed
version 1.9.0
- scanned 2026-10-16
- source github.com/MarketTrace/markettrace-agent-feed
- commit e76ffabeacd2
- transport streamable-http
- files read 1
- methodology 0.2.0
- ruleset 0.1.1
91
89measured on 45% of this axis
not assessed
no lockfile in the fetched source; dependency versions are unresolved, so no vulnerability can be attributed
82measured on 70% of this axis
41measured on 80% of this axis
The evidence
Every deduction below names the artefact that produced it. Nothing on this page was executed: the source was read, never run, and no running server was contacted.
Code Safety
- mcp_server.py:37mcp-python-path-join-unvalidated (medium/low)
A filesystem path is assembled from a value that is not a literal and opened without confinement. os.path.join discards the base entirely when the second component is absolute, and neither join nor `/` resolves `..`.
# from the live server (README §"Refresh the contract"); the version here # is what the bridge reports in serverInfo. with open(os.path.join(HERE, "tools.json"), encoding="utf-8") as fh: _contract = json.load(fh) TOOLS = _contract["tools"] - mcp_server.py:79mcp-python-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound HTTP request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any part of it is caller-supplied, the server can be steered at internal hosts — cloud metadata endpoints, admin ports, other tenants.
method="POST", ) with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=30) as resp: body = resp.read().decode("utf-8", "replace") if resp.headers.get("Content-Type", "").startswith("text/event-stream"):
Auth Posture
- authentication_model
no authentication appears in the source we fetched, but this server's network endpoint is a hosted remote, whose authentication can be enforced in front of its code — and no credential header is declared. An undeclared header is not an absent one, so `03` §4's "no authentication" band is not established.
- transport_security
declared endpoint(s) are HTTPS: https://api.markettrace.ai/mcp; scored 80, not 100: `03` §4 reserves 100 for HTTPS *with HSTS*, and an HSTS header can only be seen by connecting, which `04` §9 does not do. This is an unverifiable band, not an observed absence.
- secret_handling
no committed credential found, and no environment variable with a credential-shaped name is read anywhere in the source
- authorization_granularity
no tool registration was recognised anywhere in the source. An MCP server registers tools by definition, so this is a gap in our detection rather than a server with none, and `03` §4's threshold cannot be applied to it. A tool-list handler IS present, so the tools are built in a shape this counter could not enumerate.
Maintenance
- recency
last commit 10 day(s) before 2026-10-16
- issue_responsiveness
lifetime median (1 issue(s) in the last 6 months, under `03` §5's floor of 3): 4.8 day(s) to first maintainer comment
- release_cadence
a release exists but fewer than two fall inside `03` §5's 12-month window, so no median gap can be taken — and §5's remaining bands are all defined on that median. A limit of the methodology, not of this repository.
- bus_factor
sole maintainer
- repository_signals
`03` §5 scores this by quartile WITHIN the server's category, which needs a distribution across every scanned server and so cannot be computed while scanning one. It is a post-pass over the crawl and that pass does not exist yet.
Transparency
- license
LICENSE present with no SPDX-License-Identifier tag; identified as 'MIT' from its text
- readme_quality
README.md: over the size floor but none of `03` §7's content heuristics matched
- declared_scopes
specific scope or access documentation is present, but `03` §7's 100 and 60 bands both compare it against scopes INFERRED from static analysis, which is not built yet. Scoring 100 on an empty inference would be a vacuous truth — 'all ∅ inferred scopes are documented'.
- changelog
no CHANGELOG in the fetched source. `03` §7's partial credit for tagged releases carrying release notes is not applied here — that needs the forge API, which this check does not call
- security_contact
SECURITY.md present
Contest a finding
Every number here comes from a rule reading published source, and rules get things wrong. If something on this page is incorrect — or correct but mitigated by a check the rule cannot see — open an issue and we answer it in writing. A finding we got wrong is removed and the rule is fixed; one that stands is answered on the record.
Anyone can file: the maintainer, a researcher who disagrees with the classification, or a user who tested the server and could not reproduce it. Name this server and the rule or advisory ID shown beside the finding above. We aim to reply within five business days and to resolve within ten.