ai.lamdis/exchange
version 0.1.0
- scanned 2026-10-16
- source github.com/lamdis-ai/lamdis-protocol
- commit 78aff5f6c93b
- transport streamable-http
- files read 237
- methodology 0.2.0
- ruleset 0.1.1
No tag matching version 0.1.0 was found in this repository, so the scan read the default branch instead. The findings below describe that code, not necessarily the released version.
23
1 vendored or minified path was excluded before scanning; machine-generated bundles are not the server's own code
68measured on 65% of this axis
30measured on 91% of this axis
1 vulnerability could not be placed in `03` §6's table and is listed but not scored
91measured on 90% of this axis
53measured on 80% of this axis
The evidence
Every deduction below names the artefact that produced it. Nothing on this page was executed: the source was read, never run, and no running server was contacted.
Code Safety
Showing the 50 most severe of 66 findings on this axis. The score was computed over all of them — findings beyond the fourth of a severity still deduct at a tenth of their weight — so the remainder is omitted from this page, not from the arithmetic.
- node/internal/agent/workspace.go:557mcp-go-shell-exec-interpreter (critical/medium)
A shell interpreter is invoked with a constructed command string. Go's exec.Command is safe by default precisely because it takes an argument vector; routing through `sh -c` gives that safety away.
return exec.CommandContext(ctx, "cmd", "/c", line) } return exec.CommandContext(ctx, "sh", "-c", line) } - node/internal/api/dispatch.go:277mcp-go-ssrf-metadata-endpoint (critical/medium)
The cloud instance-metadata endpoint is contacted directly.
// unchecked that is a request forgery primitive pointed at our own metadata // service, and the fact that we require https:// stops none of it — a name can // have a TLS certificate and still resolve to 169.254.169.254. func safeWebhookHost(raw string) error { u, err := url.Parse(raw) - integrations/vercel-ai/src/index.ts:119mcp-js-prototype-pollution-merge-loop (medium/medium)
Keys from a caller-supplied object are copied onto a target without excluding __proto__ / constructor / prototype. A tool argument carrying __proto__ then mutates Object.prototype for the whole process, which can turn an unrelated later property read into attacker-controlled data.
for (const k of ["where", "area", "instructions", "deliverable", "skills", "attempt_minor"] as const) { const v = input[k]; if (v !== undefined && v !== null && v !== "" && !(Array.isArray(v) && v.length === 0)) body[k] = v; } if (input.sandbox ?? true) body.sandbox = true; - bench/run_gen.py:63mcp-python-path-join-unvalidated (medium/low)
A filesystem path is assembled from a value that is not a literal and opened without confinement. os.path.join discards the base entirely when the second component is absolute, and neither join nor `/` resolves `..`.
image_for(iid), "sleep", "infinity"], check=True, capture_output=True) containers.add(name) log = open(os.path.join(logdir, iid + ".log"), "w") script = ('source /opt/miniconda3/bin/activate testbed 2>/dev/null; cd /testbed; ' 'git config --global --add safe.directory /testbed; git config core.fileMode false; ' - bench/run_gen.py:101mcp-python-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound HTTP request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any part of it is caller-supplied, the server can be steered at internal hosts — cloud metadata endpoints, admin ports, other tenants.
def usage(key): req = urllib.request.Request("https://openrouter.ai/api/v1/key", headers={"Authorization": "Bearer " + key}) return json.load(urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=30))["data"]["usage"] - bench/run_gen.py:115mcp-python-path-join-unvalidated (medium/low)
A filesystem path is assembled from a value that is not a literal and opened without confinement. os.path.join discards the base entirely when the second component is absolute, and neither join nor `/` resolves `..`.
cfg = {"model": model, "trust": "project", "unguarded": True, "max_tool_calls": 200, "max_runs_per_day": 100000, "max_fetches_per_day": 100000, "max_tokens_per_day": 1000000000} json.dump(cfg, open(os.path.join(data, "agent.json"), "w"), indent=2) - bench/run_gen.py:158mcp-python-path-join-unvalidated (medium/low)
A filesystem path is assembled from a value that is not a literal and opened without confinement. os.path.join discards the base entirely when the second component is absolute, and neither join nor `/` resolves `..`.
shutil.rmtree(data, ignore_errors=True) setup_data(model, data) log = open(os.path.join(logdir, inst["instance_id"] + ".log"), "w") # Offline: the score has to come from the repository, not from finding # the upstream fix on the web. - brand/mark.py:41mcp-python-path-join-unvalidated (medium/low)
A filesystem path is assembled from a value that is not a literal and opened without confinement. os.path.join discards the base entirely when the second component is absolute, and neither join nor `/` resolves `..`.
mono, color = mono.replace('"0.55"', f'"{sw}"'), color.replace('"0.55"', f'"{sw}"') tag = "-small" if SMALL else "" open(f"lamdis-mark{tag}.svg","w").write(mono+"\n"); open(f"lamdis-mark-color{tag}.svg","w").write(color+"\n") print(vb); print(d); print(faces) - brand/mark.py:41mcp-python-path-join-unvalidated (medium/low)
A filesystem path is assembled from a value that is not a literal and opened without confinement. os.path.join discards the base entirely when the second component is absolute, and neither join nor `/` resolves `..`.
mono, color = mono.replace('"0.55"', f'"{sw}"'), color.replace('"0.55"', f'"{sw}"') tag = "-small" if SMALL else "" open(f"lamdis-mark{tag}.svg","w").write(mono+"\n"); open(f"lamdis-mark-color{tag}.svg","w").write(color+"\n") print(vb); print(d); print(faces) - integrations/crewai/lamdis_crewai/_client.py:30mcp-python-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound HTTP request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any part of it is caller-supplied, the server can be steered at internal hosts — cloud metadata endpoints, admin ports, other tenants.
headers["authorization"] = f"Bearer {token}" try: r = httpx.request(method, base_url() + path, json=json, headers=headers, timeout=30.0) except httpx.HTTPError as e: return {"error": f"could not reach the exchange: {e}", "http_status": 0} - integrations/langchain/lamdis_langchain/_client.py:30mcp-python-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound HTTP request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any part of it is caller-supplied, the server can be steered at internal hosts — cloud metadata endpoints, admin ports, other tenants.
headers["authorization"] = f"Bearer {token}" try: r = httpx.request(method, base_url() + path, json=json, headers=headers, timeout=30.0) except httpx.HTTPError as e: return {"error": f"could not reach the exchange: {e}", "http_status": 0} - integrations/openai-agents/lamdis_openai_agents/_client.py:30mcp-python-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound HTTP request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any part of it is caller-supplied, the server can be steered at internal hosts — cloud metadata endpoints, admin ports, other tenants.
headers["authorization"] = f"Bearer {token}" try: r = httpx.request(method, base_url() + path, json=json, headers=headers, timeout=30.0) except httpx.HTTPError as e: return {"error": f"could not reach the exchange: {e}", "http_status": 0} - integrations/vercel-ai/src/index.ts:91mcp-js-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any part is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at internal hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.
if (input.skills?.length) body.skills = input.skills; if (input.sandbox) body.sandbox = true; return request(opts, "POST", "/v1/quote", body); } - integrations/vercel-ai/src/index.ts:122mcp-js-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any part is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at internal hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.
} if (input.sandbox ?? true) body.sandbox = true; return request(opts, "POST", "/v1/tasks", body); } - integrations/vercel-ai/src/index.ts:127mcp-js-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any part is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at internal hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.
/** GET /v1/jobs/{job} with the lbt_ token that came back when it was posted. */ export function jobStatus(job: string, token: string, opts: LamdisOptions = {}): Promise<LamdisResult> { return request(opts, "GET", `/v1/jobs/${encodeURIComponent(job)}`, undefined, token); } - integrations/vercel-ai/src/index.ts:132mcp-js-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any part is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at internal hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.
/** GET /v1/jobs/{job}/receipt: the signed receipt once the job has settled. */ export function jobReceipt(job: string, token: string, opts: LamdisOptions = {}): Promise<LamdisResult> { return request(opts, "GET", `/v1/jobs/${encodeURIComponent(job)}/receipt`, undefined, token); } - node/cmd/lamdis/browser.go:248mcp-go-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound HTTP request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any component is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.
func browserWS(versionURL string) (string, error) { resp, err := http.Get(versionURL) if err != nil { return "", err - node/cmd/lamdis/browser.go:264mcp-go-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound HTTP request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any component is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.
func redeemDeviceCode(host, code string) (string, error) { body, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"code": code}) resp, err := http.Post(host+"/app/api/device/redeem", "application/json", bytes.NewReader(body)) if err != nil { return "", err - node/cmd/lamdis/browser.go:330mcp-go-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound HTTP request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any component is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.
deadline := time.Now().Add(d) for time.Now().Before(deadline) { if resp, err := http.Get(url); err == nil { resp.Body.Close() return nil - node/cmd/lamdis/link.go:73mcp-go-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound HTTP request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any component is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.
body, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"code": code, "name": hostname()}) url := strings.TrimRight(*host, "/") + "/v1/link" req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "POST", url, bytes.NewReader(body)) if err != nil { return err - node/internal/agent/attach.go:74mcp-go-path-join-unvalidated (medium/low)
A filesystem path is assembled from a non-literal and opened without confinement. filepath.Join cleans `..` but does not confine: a component of "../../etc/passwd" still resolves outside the base.
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unknown file") } return os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(r.DataDir, "files", a.ID+ext)) } - node/internal/agent/connect.go:136mcp-go-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound HTTP request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any component is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.
func searchRegistry(ctx context.Context, q string) []Candidate { u := registryBase + "/v0.1/servers?limit=30&version=latest&search=" + url.QueryEscape(q) req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", u, nil) if err != nil { return nil - node/internal/agent/fetch.go:144mcp-go-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound HTTP request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any component is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.
}, } req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", u.String(), nil) if err != nil { rec.Error = err.Error() - node/internal/agent/model.go:250mcp-go-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound HTTP request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any component is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.
return Message{}, Usage{}, err } hr, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "POST", o.Endpoint(), bytes.NewReader(body)) if err != nil { return Message{}, Usage{}, err - node/internal/agent/model.go:413mcp-go-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound HTTP request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any component is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.
return Message{}, Usage{}, err } hr, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "POST", o.Endpoint(), bytes.NewReader(body)) if err != nil { return Message{}, Usage{}, err - node/internal/agent/model.go:492mcp-go-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound HTTP request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any component is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.
base = openRouterURL } req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, base+"/models", nil) if err != nil { return nil, err - node/internal/agent/model.go:544mcp-go-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound HTTP request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any component is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.
} body, _ := json.Marshal(req) hr, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "POST", o.Endpoint(), bytes.NewReader(body)) if err != nil { return "", nil, err - node/internal/agent/oauth.go:64mcp-go-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound HTTP request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any component is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.
return err } req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", u, nil) if err != nil { return err - node/internal/agent/oauth.go:104mcp-go-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound HTTP request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any component is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.
// OAuth answers 401 and names its metadata in the challenge. meta := "" req, _ := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "POST", mcpURL, strings.NewReader(`{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{}}`)) req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json") req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json, text/event-stream") - node/internal/agent/oauth.go:205mcp-go-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound HTTP request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any component is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.
"application_type": "web", }) req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "POST", o.RegisterURL, strings.NewReader(string(body))) if err != nil { return err - node/internal/agent/oauth.go:271mcp-go-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound HTTP request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any component is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.
form.Set("client_secret", o.ClientSecret) } req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "POST", o.TokenURL, strings.NewReader(form.Encode())) if err != nil { return err - node/internal/agent/provision.go:87mcp-go-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound HTTP request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any component is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.
body = bytes.NewReader(raw) } req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, method, p.base()+path, body) if err != nil { return err - node/internal/anchor/calendar.go:42mcp-go-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound HTTP request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any component is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.
// submit posts a 32-byte digest and returns the calendar's timestamp of it. func (c *calendar) submit(ctx context.Context, base string, digest []byte) (*Timestamp, error) { req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, strings.TrimSuffix(base, "/")+"/digest", bytes.NewReader(digest)) if err != nil { - node/internal/anchor/calendar.go:58mcp-go-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound HTTP request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any component is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.
// get fetches the timestamp of a commitment the calendar was given earlier. func (c *calendar) get(ctx context.Context, base string, commitment []byte) (*Timestamp, error) { req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, strings.TrimSuffix(base, "/")+"/timestamp/"+hex.EncodeToString(commitment), nil) if err != nil { - node/internal/api/api.go:143mcp-go-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound HTTP request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any component is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.
// FetchNodeInfo returns the principal a node at baseURL identifies as. func FetchNodeInfo(ctx context.Context, baseURL string) (string, error) { req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, baseURL+"/v1/node", nil) if err != nil { return "", err - node/internal/api/api.go:250mcp-go-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound HTTP request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any component is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.
return err } req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, t.BaseURL+path, bytes.NewReader(body)) if err != nil { return err - node/internal/api/auth.go:82mcp-go-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound HTTP request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any component is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.
return nil, err } req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, a.endpoint(), bytes.NewReader(body)) if err != nil { return nil, err - node/internal/api/delete_account.go:64mcp-go-path-join-unvalidated (medium/low)
A filesystem path is assembled from a non-literal and opened without confinement. filepath.Join cleans `..` but does not confine: a component of "../../etc/passwd" still resolves outside the base.
// quietly start an empty account under the same name. os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(h.Root, ".deleted"), 0o700) os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(h.Root, ".deleted", me.ID), nil, 0o600) h.logf("host: account deleted at its owner's request") writeJSON(w, map[string]any{"ok": true}) - node/internal/api/delete_account.go:106mcp-go-path-join-unvalidated (medium/low)
A filesystem path is assembled from a non-literal and opened without confinement. filepath.Join cleans `..` but does not confine: a component of "../../etc/passwd" still resolves outside the base.
h.logf("host: report filed on %s in %s", in.Entry, in.Thread) os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(h.Root, ".reports"), 0o700) os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(h.Root, ".reports", in.Entry+".txt"), []byte(report), 0o600) if h.Mail != nil { h.Mail.Send(r.Context(), envOrDefault("LAMDIS_REPORTS_TO", "support@lamdis.ai"), "Lamdis report: message "+in.Entry, report) - node/internal/api/dispatch.go:248mcp-go-ssrf-nonliteral-url (medium/low)
An outbound HTTP request is made to a URL that is not a literal. If any component is caller-supplied the server can be aimed at hosts it can reach and the caller cannot.
defer cancel() req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "POST", cap.Webhook, bytes.NewReader(body)) if err != nil { return false - node/internal/api/email.go:47mcp-go-path-join-unvalidated (medium/low)
A filesystem path is assembled from a non-literal and opened without confinement. filepath.Join cleans `..` but does not confine: a component of "../../etc/passwd" still resolves outside the base.
func (h *Host) accountByEmail(e string) *Account { raw, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(h.emailIndex(), emailKey(e))) if err != nil { return nil - node/internal/api/email.go:170mcp-go-path-join-unvalidated (medium/low)
A filesystem path is assembled from a non-literal and opened without confinement. filepath.Join cleans `..` but does not confine: a component of "../../etc/passwd" still resolves outside the base.
} os.MkdirAll(h.emailIndex(), 0o700) os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(h.emailIndex(), emailKey(p.email)), []byte(me.ID), 0o600) os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(me.Dir, "email_confirmed"), []byte(p.email), 0o600) h.promote(me) - node/internal/api/files.go:115mcp-go-path-join-unvalidated (medium/low)
A filesystem path is assembled from a non-literal and opened without confinement. filepath.Join cleans `..` but does not confine: a component of "../../etc/passwd" still resolves outside the base.
dir := filesDir(a.DataDir) os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o700) if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, id+ext), data, 0o600); err != nil { writeStatusJSON(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, map[string]any{"error": "could not keep the file"}) return - node/internal/api/files.go:121mcp-go-path-join-unvalidated (medium/low)
A filesystem path is assembled from a non-literal and opened without confinement. filepath.Join cleans `..` but does not confine: a component of "../../etc/passwd" still resolves outside the base.
ref := FileRef{ID: id, Name: name, Type: typ, Size: int64(len(data)), URL: a.fileURL(id)} meta, _ := json.Marshal(ref) os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, id+".json"), meta, 0o600) writeJSON(w, ref) } - node/internal/api/files.go:140mcp-go-path-join-unvalidated (medium/low)
A filesystem path is assembled from a non-literal and opened without confinement. filepath.Join cleans `..` but does not confine: a component of "../../etc/passwd" still resolves outside the base.
continue } raw, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(filesDir(a.DataDir), id+".json")) if err != nil { continue - node/internal/api/files.go:175mcp-go-path-join-unvalidated (medium/low)
A filesystem path is assembled from a non-literal and opened without confinement. filepath.Join cleans `..` but does not confine: a component of "../../etc/passwd" still resolves outside the base.
return } raw, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(filesDir(dataDir), id+".json")) if err != nil { http.NotFound(w, r) - node/internal/api/files.go:187mcp-go-path-join-unvalidated (medium/low)
A filesystem path is assembled from a non-literal and opened without confinement. filepath.Join cleans `..` but does not confine: a component of "../../etc/passwd" still resolves outside the base.
return } data, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(filesDir(dataDir), id+ext)) if err != nil { http.NotFound(w, r) - node/internal/api/files.go:245mcp-go-path-join-unvalidated (medium/low)
A filesystem path is assembled from a non-literal and opened without confinement. filepath.Join cleans `..` but does not confine: a component of "../../etc/passwd" still resolves outside the base.
} dir := filesDir(filepath.Join(h.Root, p[0])) raw, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dir, id+".json")) if err != nil { return nil, err - node/internal/api/files.go:255mcp-go-path-join-unvalidated (medium/low)
A filesystem path is assembled from a non-literal and opened without confinement. filepath.Join cleans `..` but does not confine: a component of "../../etc/passwd" still resolves outside the base.
return nil, os.ErrNotExist } return os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dir, id+ext)) } - node/internal/api/guest.go:136mcp-go-path-join-unvalidated (medium/low)
A filesystem path is assembled from a non-literal and opened without confinement. filepath.Join cleans `..` but does not confine: a component of "../../etc/passwd" still resolves outside the base.
return nil, err } if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(h.Root, ".by-subject", accountID(subject)), []byte(guestID), 0o600); err != nil { return nil, err }
Auth Posture
- authentication_model
source reads a credential header but no enforcing middleware or rejection path was found — `03` §4's "present but optional or trivially bypassable" band
- transport_security
declared endpoint(s) are HTTPS: https://exchange.lamdis.ai/mcp; scored 80, not 100: `03` §4 reserves 100 for HTTPS *with HSTS*, and an HSTS header can only be seen by connecting, which `04` §9 does not do. This is an unverifiable band, not an observed absence.
- secret_handling
detect-secrets matched 23 credential-shaped string(s), every one from a keyword or entropy heuristic (Base64 High Entropy String, Basic Auth Credentials, Hex High Entropy String, Secret Keyword). Those flag placeholders, variable names and content hashes as readily as credentials, so they do not establish the committed credential `03` §4's 0 asserts, and this sub-check is not scored; Basic Auth Credentials at bench/sample50.json:1; Secret Keyword at node/cmd/lamdis/review.go:137; Secret Keyword at node/internal/account/account.go:159; Secret Keyword at node/internal/agent/connect_test.go:21; Secret Keyword at node/internal/agent/connect_test.go:33; Hex High Entropy String at node/internal/agent/connect_test.go:41; Secret Keyword at node/internal/agent/oauth.go:191; Secret Keyword at node/internal/agent/provision.go:130; Secret Keyword at node/internal/agent/provision_test.go:45; Basic Auth Credentials at node/internal/agent/runner_test.go:288; …and 13 more matches
- authorization_granularity
no tool registration was recognised anywhere in the source. An MCP server registers tools by definition, so this is a gap in our detection rather than a server with none, and `03` §4's threshold cannot be applied to it.
Dependency Health
- sdk/typescript/package-lock.jsonvitest 2.1.9 — GHSA-5xrq-8626-4rwp
direct, CVSS 9.8, fixed in 3.2.6
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-5xrq-8626-4rwp - sdk/typescript/package-lock.jsontinypool 1.1.1 — GHSA-5gmw-xhrv-c9v3
transitive, CVSS 9.5, fixed in 2.1.1
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-5gmw-xhrv-c9v3 - sdk/typescript/package-lock.jsontinypool 1.1.1 — GHSA-85c8-ppgw-ccpr
transitive, CVSS 9.5, fixed in 2.1.2
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-85c8-ppgw-ccpr - sdk/typescript/package-lock.jsonsource-map-js 1.2.1 — GHSA-68fv-2mgg-jv7q
transitive, CVSS 8.7, fixed in 1.2.2
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-68fv-2mgg-jv7q - sdk/typescript/package-lock.jsonvite 5.4.21 — GHSA-fx2h-pf6j-xcff
transitive, CVSS 8.2, fixed in 6.4.3
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-fx2h-pf6j-xcff - sdk/typescript/package-lock.jsonvitest 2.1.9 — GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9
direct, CVSS 5.9, fixed in 4.1.11
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9 - sdk/typescript/package-lock.jsonvite 5.4.21 — GHSA-4w7w-66w2-5vf9
transitive, CVSS 6.3, fixed in 6.4.2
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-4w7w-66w2-5vf9 - sdk/typescript/package-lock.json@vitest/mocker 2.1.9 — GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9
transitive, CVSS 5.9, fixed in 4.1.11
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9 - sdk/typescript/package-lock.jsonvite 5.4.21 — GHSA-v6wh-96g9-6wx3
transitive, CVSS 5.5, fixed in 6.4.3
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-v6wh-96g9-6wx3 - sdk/typescript/package-lock.jsonesbuild 0.21.5 — GHSA-67mh-4wv8-2f99
transitive, CVSS 5.3, fixed in 0.25.0
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-67mh-4wv8-2f99 - sdk/typescript/package-lock.jsonesbuild 0.27.7 — GHSA-g7r4-m6w7-qqqr
transitive, CVSS 2.5, fixed in 0.28.1
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-g7r4-m6w7-qqqr - node/go.modgolang.org/x/crypto 0.57.0 — GO-2026-5932
transitive, no CVSS published
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-5932
Maintenance
- recency
last commit 7 day(s) before 2026-10-16
- issue_responsiveness
lifetime median (1 issue(s) in the last 6 months, under `03` §5's floor of 3): 4.8 day(s) to first maintainer comment
- release_cadence
released 7 day(s) ago (by releases), inside `03` §5's 30-day window
- bus_factor
2 regular authors in the last 12 months
- repository_signals
`03` §5 scores this by quartile WITHIN the server's category, which needs a distribution across every scanned server and so cannot be computed while scanning one. It is a post-pass over the crawl and that pass does not exist yet.
Transparency
- license
LICENSE present with no SPDX-License-Identifier tag; identified as 'MIT' from its text
- readme_quality
README.md: installation instructions (+25), configuration documented (+25), exposed tools or resources enumerated (+30), states what the server does in the first 200 words (+20)
- declared_scopes
specific scope or access documentation is present, but `03` §7's 100 and 60 bands both compare it against scopes INFERRED from static analysis, which is not built yet. Scoring 100 on an empty inference would be a vacuous truth — 'all ∅ inferred scopes are documented'.
- changelog
no CHANGELOG in the fetched source. `03` §7's partial credit for tagged releases carrying release notes is not applied here — that needs the forge API, which this check does not call
- security_contact
no SECURITY.md and no disclosure contact in the README, so a finder has no route to report a vulnerability privately
Contest a finding
Every number here comes from a rule reading published source, and rules get things wrong. If something on this page is incorrect — or correct but mitigated by a check the rule cannot see — open an issue and we answer it in writing. A finding we got wrong is removed and the rule is fixed; one that stands is answered on the record.
Anyone can file: the maintainer, a researcher who disagrees with the classification, or a user who tested the server and could not reproduce it. Name this server and the rule or advisory ID shown beside the finding above. We aim to reply within five business days and to resolve within ten.