ai.dinglebear/rtailscale

The evidence

Every deduction below names the artefact that produced it. Nothing on this page was executed: the source was read, never run, and no running server was contacted.

Code Safety

• scripts/check-package.js:203mcp-js-path-join-unvalidated (medium/low)

  A filesystem path is assembled from a non-literal and read or written without confinement. path.join does not resolve away `..`, and path.resolve discards the base entirely on an absolute second component.

  
    for (const relative of new Set(runtimeFiles)) {
      const text = fs.readFileSync(path.join(packageRoot, relative), "utf8");
      assert(!text.includes('"..", ".."'), `${relative} must not resolve paths outside the package at runtime`);
      assert(!text.includes("'..', '..'"), `${relative} must not resolve paths outside the package at runtime`);

• scripts/check-package.js:271mcp-js-path-join-unvalidated (medium/low)

  A filesystem path is assembled from a non-literal and read or written without confinement. path.join does not resolve away `..`, and path.resolve discards the base entirely on an absolute second component.

    for (const license of repoLicenseFiles()) {
      assert(
        Buffer.from(tarExtract(tarball, `package/${license}`)).equals(fs.readFileSync(path.join(repoRoot, license))),
        `packed ${license} must match repo ${license}`,
      );

Auth Posture

• authentication_model

  credential requirement present; enforcement partially evidenced

• transport_security

  declared endpoint(s) are HTTPS: https://ts.dinglebear.ai/mcp; scored 80, not 100: `03` §4 reserves 100 for HTTPS *with HSTS*, and an HSTS header can only be seen by connecting, which `04` §9 does not do. This is an unverifiable band, not an observed absence.

• secret_handling

  detect-secrets matched 1 credential-shaped string(s), every one from a keyword or entropy heuristic (Secret Keyword). Those flag placeholders, variable names and content hashes as readily as credentials, so they do not establish the committed credential `03` §4's 0 asserts, and this sub-check is not scored; Secret Keyword at README.md:132

• authorization_granularity

  no tool registration was recognised anywhere in the source. An MCP server registers tools by definition, so this is a gap in our detection rather than a server with none, and `03` §4's threshold cannot be applied to it.

Maintenance

• recency

  last commit 15 day(s) before 2026-10-16

• issue_responsiveness

  lifetime median (1 issue(s) in the last 6 months, under `03` §5's floor of 3): 4.8 day(s) to first maintainer comment

• release_cadence

  median release gap 4 days (by releases), last release 80 day(s) ago

• bus_factor

  sole maintainer

• repository_signals

  `03` §5 scores this by quartile WITHIN the server's category, which needs a distribution across every scanned server and so cannot be computed while scanning one. It is a post-pass over the crawl and that pass does not exist yet.

Transparency

• license

  LICENSE present with no SPDX-License-Identifier tag; identified as 'MIT' from its text

• readme_quality

  README.md: installation instructions (+25), configuration documented (+25), exposed tools or resources enumerated (+30), states what the server does in the first 200 words (+20)

• declared_scopes

  specific scope or access documentation is present, but `03` §7's 100 and 60 bands both compare it against scopes INFERRED from static analysis, which is not built yet. Scoring 100 on an empty inference would be a vacuous truth — 'all ∅ inferred scopes are documented'.

• changelog

  no CHANGELOG in the fetched source. `03` §7's partial credit for tagged releases carrying release notes is not applied here — that needs the forge API, which this check does not call

• security_contact

  no SECURITY.md and no disclosure contact in the README, so a finder has no route to report a vulnerability privately